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NOTES
THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF STATUTORY INJUNCTIONS*
THE widespread legislative use of the injunction as a technique for enforcing
regulatory statutes' has raised problems relating to its permissible scope.2
These problems have been brought into focus by a recent circuit court of
appeals decision in Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Company 3 upholding a
preliminary injunction of unusual compass wlich restrained the defendant
corporation from "doing or omitting to do, any ... act in violation of any
regulation or price schedule heretofore or hereafter 4 issued by the Office of
Price Administration." 5
* Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
1. See the provisions of the Sherman Act. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 4 (1940),
the Elkins Act, 32 STAT. 848 (1903), 49 U. S. C. § 43 (1940), and equivalent prtivisions fur
the enforcement of cease and desist orders in the Natiunal Labur Relatikns Act, 49 STAT.
454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (1940), the Federal Trade Cummissimn Act, 38 SrT. 720
(1914), 15 U. S. C. §45 (1940), and the Clayton Act, 38 ST.%T. 735 (1914). 15 U. S. C. §21
(1940). The government agency praying for an injunction according to the provisins 0A a
statute does not have to meet all the conditions surrounding the granting mf an injunction
without a statutory mandate. Neither inadequacy of legal remedies i',r threat of irrepara-
ble injury need be proved. Brown v. Hecht Co., 49 F. Supp. 528, 532 (D. D. C. 1943). Even
when the statute is silent, the Government need not show a pecuniary interest in order t.J
invoke equity jurisdiction. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 526 (1895). See alsu H, r.uui:, MOD-
mi Eourr (3d ed. 1943) 494-502.
2. The problem of scope is to be differentiated from that vi specifiom-,ns'. Rule f(5(d),
FED. RuLEs Civ. PRoc., provides that injunctions "shall be specific in terms; shall describ2
in reasonable detail, and not by reference to . . . [any] other document, the . . . acts
sought to be restrained. . . ." It would appear that this pruvisiun does not exclud e tht:
incorporation by reference of the provisions of a statute, or administrative regulations issucii
in pursuance of a statute. See New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. v. InItertate
Commerce Comm., 200 U. S. 361 (1906) (by implication). C'f. Cudahy Packing Co. v.
United States, 15 F. (2d) 133, 135 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926), for a discussiun uf the wurd "ducu-
ment." But cJ. Brown v. Sacher, 53 F. Supp. 77, 79 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). Fur an illustra-
tion of how definiteness in orders is treated compare Arkansas Wholesale Grocers Ass'n v.
Federal Trade Comm., 18 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927), cici. dcnicd, 275 U. S. 533
(1927), with Cream of Wheat Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 14 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926). See Note (1920) ,Nebulous Injunctions, 19 MicE. L Rm. 3.
3. 143 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
4. That an injunction may include future administrative regulations seems well set-
tled. If it were otherwise, it would be impossible to enjoin violation of tariff, price, or any
other schedules which are subject to frequent change. See Bitterman V. Louisville and
Nashville R. R., 207 U. S. 205 (1907) (future ticket issues); New York, New Haven &
Hartford R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 200 U. S. 361 (1906) (freight rates) ; Cal-
vert Distillers Corp. v. Stockman, 26 F. Supp. 73 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) (prices) ; Calvert
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The principles governing the scope of injunctions have been discussed very
little, and the few Supreme Court cases in point 6 are ad hoc decisions which
provide slight guidance for determining whether a given injunction can be
justified. In the famous case of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v.
United States 7 the Supreme Court upheld a decree enjoining the defendants
"from in any way conspiring or combining to violate the [Sherman Anti-Trust]
Act." 8 Injunctions almost equally broad were sustained under the Railway
Labor Act of 1926 9 where a defendant railroad recognized a company union
in violation of the act,10 and under the Sherman Act "- where defendants at-
tempted to coerce poultry dealers to rent coops at excessive rates.12 On the
other hand, the Supreme Court has refused to uphold act-wide injunctions
Distilling Co. v. Brandon, 24 F. Supp. 857 (W. D. S. C. 1938) (prices). For cases enjoin-
ing violations of future OPA regulations see Bowles v. Nu Way Laundry Co., 144 F. (2d)
741 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) ; Bowles v. Barclay Corp., 57 F. Supp. 159 (E. D. Pa. 1944) ;
Brown v. Society Brand Hat Co., 16 OPA Serv. 620:206 (E. D. Mo. 1943); Brown v.
Sanchez Osorio, 16 OPA Serv. 620:202 (D. Puerto Rico 1943); Henderson v. C. Thomas
Stores, 48 F. Supp. 295 (D. Minn. 1942) ; Henderson v. Wilson & Co., 16 OPA Serv. 620:39
(N. D. Ill. 1942). But cf. Bowles v. May Hardwood Co., 140 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 6th,
1944).
5. Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F. (2d) 38, 41 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944). The
injunction was issued pursuant to § 205a of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56
STAT. 2., 50 U. S. C. § 925a (Supp. 1942).
6. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426 (1941); Local 167 v. United
States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934) ; Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930) ; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,
221 U. S. 1 (1911); New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm., 200 U. S. 361 (1906) ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905) ; cf.
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436, 461 (1939) ; Warner & Co. v. Lilly,
265 U. S. 526, 532 (1924).
7. 221 U. S. 1 (1911). "... we construe . . . the decree, not as depriving the stock-
holders or corporations of the right to live under the law of the land, but as compelling
obedience to that law." Id. at 81.
8. Id. at 79.
9. 44 STAT. 1447 (1926), as amended by 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 151 (1940).
10. Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281
U. S. 548 (1930). The decree enjoined the defendant railroad from ". . . in any way or
manner interfering with, influencing, intimidating or coercing plaintiffs . . . of their free
and untrammeled right of self-organization." Id. at 555-6, n. 1. The scope of the injunc-
tion, how-ever, was neither an issue in the case nor discussed in the opinion.
11. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2, 3, 4 (1940).
12. Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934). The defendants were enjoined
.. from using any of the offices or positions in Local 167 . . . 'for the purpose of coerc-
ing marketmen to buy poultry, poultry feed, or other commodities necessary to the poultry
business from particular sellers thereof.' " Id. at 299. "The United States is entitled to
effective relief. . . . [The. injunction] should be broad enough to prevent evasion. ...
Having been shown guilty . . . appellants may not complain if the injunction binds gener-
ally as to related commodities. .. " Ibid.
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under the Sherman Act, in Swvift v. United States,13 where a dominant propor-
tion of fresh meat dealers violated the act by engaging in a variety of monopo-
listic practices, and under the Interstate Commerce Act 14 where only one rail-
road contract embodying discriminatory freight rates was proved.1 o
Recently the Supreme Court has attempted to restate the doctrine of these
cases in terms of two criteria."' Reversing an order of the National Labor
13. 196 U. S. 375 (1905) (in opinion by Holmes, J.). Besides enjtining specific mnumip i-
listic practices, the decree enjoined defendants from restraining trade ". . . by any other
method or device, the purpose and effect of which is to restrain commerce.. " Id. at
393, n. 1.
"The general objection is urged that the bill does not set forth sufficient definite or
specific facts. This objection is serious, but . ..inherent in the nature of the case. The
scheme alleged is so vast that it presents a new problem in pleading. . . . Its size mahes
the violation of the law more conspicuous, and yet the same thing makes it imlopsible to
fasten the principal fact to a certain time and place. The elements, tco, are so numerous and
shifting, even the constituent parts alleged are and from the nature must be so enten-Ave in
time and space, that somethinglof the same impossibility applies to them. . . . we are bIund
to enforce [the law] ...notwithstanding these difficulties. On the other hand we equally
are bound by the first principles of justice not to sanction a decree so vague as to put the
whole conduct of the defendants' business at the peril of a summons for contempt. lWc ca's-
not issute a geizeral iniuxtlion against all possible breaches of the las. We must steer be-
tween these opposite difficulties as best we can." Id. at 395-6 (emphasis supplied).
"The words quoted [supra] are a sweeping injunction to obey the law, and are open to
the objection which we stated .. .that it was our duty to avoid." Id. at 401 (emphasis
supplied).
14. 32 STAT. 847 (1903), 49 U. S. C. § 41 (1940).
15. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 2ola
U. S. 361 (1906). The Attorney General argued: "It is important to know how broad
injunctions issued in proceedings under this act should be, and to secure an autht.ritative
ruling the question is here presented." Id. at 378. The Circuit Court of Appeals had en-
joined the defendant railroads from performing one particular illegal contract only. Id. at
385-6. The Interstate Commerce Commission had prayed that the Chesapeake & Ohio
R. R. be enjoined from "'doing anything whatever, whereby coal or any other property
shall, by any device whatever, be transported . . . at a rate less than named in the tariffs
published and filed by such carrier, as is required by the act... and acts a;crdator, thcre-
of or supplewentary thereto, or whereby any other advantage may be given or discrimina-
tion practiced.'" Id. at 383 (emphasis supplied). The injunction prayed for against the
New Haven R. R. was equally broad. Id. at 383. In its assignment of error the Interstate
Commerce Commission insisted that defendant Chesapeake R. R. be enjoined ". . . from
giving. . . to any person, firm, or company, in any manner whatsoever, any undue ur unrea-
sonable preference or advantage.. . ." Id. at 403. While the Supreme Court broadened
the injunction somewhat by enjoining the railroad from "taking less than the rates fixed
in its published.. . rates, by means of dealing in the purchase and sale of coal . .", id.
at 405, it denounced the Interstate Commerce Commission's demands for an act-vide in-
junction as "violative of the most elementary principles of justice." Id. at 404.
16. See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426 (1941). In this case the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board had, in the words of the Supreme Court, "ordered brcadly that
respondent should in effect refrain from violating the [National Labor Relations] Act [49
STAT. 452-3 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (1940)] in any manner whatsoever...." upon a
finding that the respondent publishing company had refused to bargain with a particular
labor union. Id. at 430. The Supreme Court held that the Board was not justified "in
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Relations Board which had directed a corporation not to violate "in any man-
ner" 17 the duties imposed on the employer by the National Labor Relations
making a blanket order restraining the employer from committing any act in violation of
the statute. . .," id. at 433, and that "an appropriate order in the circumstances of the
present case would go no further than 'to restrain respondent from any refusal to bargain
and from any other acts in any manner interfering with the Guild's efforts to negotiate."
Id. at 438 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court made it clear that an act-wide cease and
desist order is not objectionable in every case by distinguishing a number of cases in which
equally broad orders as those in the Express case had been sustained. The Court contrasted
"persistent attempts" to interfere with labor's right of self-organization which justify a
broad order with the "isolated acts" in the Express case. The cases distinguished are
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939); Texas & New Orleans
R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930) ; and Virginian R. R. v. Sys-
tem Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937). Other decisions which upheld by implication
act-wide orders under the National Labor Relations Act prior to the Express case are
NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U. S. 318 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U. S. 197 (1938); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S.
333 (1938); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. -NLRB, 303 U. S. 453 (1938); NLRB
v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Cloth-
ing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103 (1937).
Since the Express case lower courts have continued to uphold act-wide cease and desist
orders when they believed that the circumstances of the particular case justified their doing
so. See NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) (illuminating
concurring opinion by Clark, J.); Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. NLRB, 129 F. (2d) 922
(C. C. A. 2d, 1942); NLRB v. Bradley Lumber Co. of Arkansas, 128 F. (2d) 768 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1942); Canyon Corporation v. NLRB, 128 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942);
NLRB v. Algoma Net Co., 124 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); NLRB v. Air Asso-
dates, Inc., 121 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 121
F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); NLRB v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. (2d) 532 (C. C. A.
4th, 1941) ; American Enka Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) ; Oughton
v. NLRB, 118 F. (2d) A86 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.
(2d) 874 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941).
On the other hand, decrees have been narrowed on the authority of the Express case in
many instances. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. NLRB, 135 F. (2d) 891, 894 (C. C. A.
7th, 1943); NLRB v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 133 F. (2d) 295, 302 (C. C. A. 6th,
1943); NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, 133 F. (2d) 876, 883 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943);
American Smelting & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 126 F. (2d) 680, 689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) ;
NLRB v. Mason Mfg. Co., 126 F. (2d) 810, 814 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) ; Reliance Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 125 F. (2d) 311, 321 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) ; NLRB v. Aluminum Goods Mfg.
Co., 125 F. (2d) 353, 358 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942); Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 123 F. (2d) 411,
419 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) ; NLRB v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 123 F. (2d) 540, 543 (C. C. A.
7th, 1941) ; NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n of Central California, 122 F. (2d)
368, 377 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., 122 F. (2d) 433, 442
(C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Warehousemen's Union v. NLRB, 121 F. (2d) 84, 85 (App. D. C.
1941); NLRB v. Continental Oil Co., 121 F. (2d) 120, 126 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941); Singer
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F. (2d) 131, 139 (C.' C. A. 7th, 1941); NLRB v. Ford Motor
Co., 119 F. (2d) 326, 330 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; NLRB v. West Texas Util. Co., 119 F.
(2d) 683, 686 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F. (2d) 1009,
1010 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
For comment on the Express case see Notes (1941) 39 MIcH. L. Rav. 1219, (1941)
41 CoL L. Ray. 911; cf. Comment (1940) 53 HARv. L. Rav. 472.
17. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426, 430 (1940).
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Act, the Court held that acts to be enjoined must be "of the same type or class
as unlawful acts which the court has found to have been committed or whose
commission in the future, unless enjoined, mnay fairly be anticipated from the
defendant's conduct in the past." Is As these criteria, similarity and proba-
bility, cannot easily, if at all, be circumscribed with precision, the Supreme
Court probably intended to leave a wide area of discretion to chancellors, while
preserving an equally extensive power to reverse in appellate courts. Thus
the Supreme Court's doctrine has reaffirmed the traditional flexibility of the
injunction as a remedial device in the modern realm of statutory injunctions.
Yet the very flexibility of the injunction has created its dangers, for only
by an injunction, followed by contempt proceedings for its non-observance,
can the equivalent of criminal penalties be imposed upon a defendant without
the safeguards of criminal procedure. 19 Therefore the bulwarks which pro-
tect the individual against the power of the state under the common law
can most easily be breached by the use of this equitable remedy. The history
of labor injunctions testifies that such a breach is more than a possibility." °
In a period in which government power is being rapidly expanded the use of
sweeping injunctions to enforce administrative regulations may create added
dangers. A broad injunction which was entirely justified when the govern-
ment was weak, as in the Standard Oil case, may become an unfortunate
precedent when the collectivist's impatience with the law's delay is threatening
18. Id. at 435 (emphasis supplied).
19. The most important of these safeguards is probably a defendant's right to a jury
trial, notwithstanding the possibility that in times of stress a jury may be more easily
swayed by prejudice than a chancellor. Quacre whether it would be advisable to amend the
Emergency Price Control Act to provide for a jury trial in contempt proceedings under
the Act. Such a provision in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 38 ST AT. 739 (1914), 28 U. S. C.
§§ 386, 387 (1940), has been held constitutional in Michaelson v. United States, 265 U. S.
42 (1924). See Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Cri rinal
Contempts i r "Inferior" Federal Courts (1924) 37 Htv. L. REv. 1010, 1033.
Since § 205b of the Emergency Price Control Act provides for criminal penalties in
cases of willful violatioV, 56 STAT. 33, 50 U. S. C. § 925b (Supp. 1942), an injunction against
violations of the act is an injunction against crime. It seems settled that such an injunction
is permissible when the crime enjoined is also a public nuisance. Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U. S. 623 (1887) ; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 593 (1S95) ; Attorney-General v. Colney Hatch
Lunatic Asylum, L. P. 4 Ch. App. 146 (1868); Attorney General v. Sharp, [1931] 1 Ch.
121 (C. A.) ; 4 PomsxRoy, Ecrru " JLRIspauDErcE § 1349 (5th ed. 1941). What types of crime
may be enjoined and what circumstances will justify an injunction is problematical. See Cald-
well, Injuictions agaibst Crime (1931) 26 ILL. L. REv. 259; Rogers, The Use of tri Injise-
tion to Prevent Crimes in Cases Involzing Houses of Ill Fane, etc. (1932) 20 Ky. L. J.
329; Note (1924) 13 CAu. L. REv. 63. "For crimes that are mala in se the injunction is
inappropriate.. . ." HAxBUTRy, MODrme Egurrt (3d ed. 1943) 496. -'To make the infrac-
tion of a criminal statute also a contempt of court is essentially an invention to evade the
safeguards of criminal procedure and to change the tribunal for determining guilt." Fn, -,x-
FtiRTER AND GE N, THE LAaoR Injncriox (1930) 107.
20. FRANKFuRE AND GamEE, THE LIAoR Ixjuncrm: (1930) gives the classic
account. Chapter III deals with the scope of labor injunctions.
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to set the tone for current intellectual trends.21  The injunction in the
Montgomery Ward case, which incorporates by reference not only the 16 vol-
umes of the OPA Service already published but whatever orders and regula-
tions the Price Administrator may add in the future, seems to furnish a timely
incentive to a re-examination of the applicable principles.
A slight shift of emphasis in the choice of the criteria governing the per-
missible scope of injunctions may serve to underlipe the necessity of protect-
ing the rights of individuals without sacrificing the virtues of flexibility in-
herent in the Supreme Court's doctrine. The presence of bad faith in a de-
fendant's past violations may be added as a criterion to that of probability of
future violations. It is true that consideration of the defendant's bad faith
seems to be implicit in the Supreme Court's insistence that violations of the
type to be enjoined must be such as may fairly be anticipated from the de-
fendant's past conduct, since future offenses could hardly be expected of an in-
advertent offender. Yet to make bad faith an explicit criterion would prevent
manipulation of the fair anticipation test for purposes of placing a well-
meaning defendant under an undue threat.
22
Explicit insistence that the comprehensiveness of a statutory injunction bear
some relation to the magnitude of public danger created by the possible com-
mission of the acts to be enjoined may be suggested as an additional test in
dealing with the problem of scope, on the assumption that only irresistible
demands of public necessity can extenuate the jeopardizing of an individual's
freedom from fear. Although the concept of public threat has not been estab-
lished as a criterion in the precedents, its adoption, far from conflicting with
past decisions, may serve to reconcile seemingly inconsistent holdings in a
few instances. Thus the circumstances which led the Supreme Court to up-
hold an act-wide injunction in the Standard Oil case 28 were described in its
opinion as "a monopolizatibn" 24 as distinguished from "an attempt to monopo-
lize" 2 5 which had been found insufficient to warrant a similar decree in the
earlier Swift case.20 This distinction may be translated into terms of degree
of a public threat, for the danger to the public interest is less where competition
still exists than where competition has already been eliminated. Likewise, a
21. For an analysis of the dangers to democracy inherent in an excessive multiplica-
tion of government controls, see HAYEx, THE ROAD TO Sz anoM (1944).
22. To a certain degree the peril of contempt proceedings is of course inevitable. Com-
pare the language of Mr. Justice Holmes in Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 395
(1905), quoted in note 13 mipra. "The onus thrown upon the Defendants, who have to com-
ply with the terms of the injunction, is a necessary consequence of their own illegal
act... " Lord Hatherley, L. C., in Attorney-Generalv. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum,
L. R. 4 Ch. App. 146, 162 (1868).
23. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 80, 81 (1911).
24. Id. at 77.
25. Ibid.
26. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375,o905),
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single contract embodying discriminatory freight rates 2 may reasonably be
considered a threat not seriously alarming, a view which would explain the
Court's reluctance to enjoin all violations of the Interstate Commerce Act be-
cause of that contract's illegality.2-
By considering the magnitude of threat to the public in framing its decree,
a court follows the traditional chancery principle of weighing the equities of
contesting parties. Since a government agency in the enforcement of a statute
is by definition representing the public, and since the equities on the side o f the
public will usually weigh stronger than the equities of an individual, it is natural
for a government agency to insist that something in the nature of a blanket pre-
sumption of righteousness should be indulged in its favor, particularly when
such an insistence can be fortified with Supreme Court dicta." Indeed, in the
case of Hecht v. Bowles,3 c the Price Administrator argued that the language
of the Price Control Act 3 ' makes the issuance of an injunction mandatory
upon the showing of a violation, so that "the conditions which have triditi.nallv
hedged about the gratiting of equitable injunctions have no application."3 2
The Supreme Court, however, firmly rejected "such a drastic departure from
the traditions of equity practice." 3 While it is true, as the Court emphasized
in the same opinion,3 4 that the public interest deserves special prutecti.on, the
27. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. v. Interstate Cmnerce 0.mm., 2J0
U. S. 361 (1905).
28. The same rationale may explain the varying scope of cease and desist o.rders F-sued
under the National Labor Relations Act in the cases collected in i,,te 16 supra.
29. "For the standards of the public interest, not the requirement% i.f private litiFatin, m
measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases." Hecht 0.-mlany v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 331 (1944). "Courts of equity may, and frcqUtzltly du, g, much far-
ther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than the%, are accus-
tomed to go when only prifate interests are involved." Virginian Ry. v. Sytem Iudlratun
No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 552 (1937). "The United States is entitled t,-o effcctive rif . . .
doubts should be resolved in favor of the Government.. . ." Lcal 17 v. United States,
291 U. S. 293, 299 (1934).
30. 321 U. S. 321 (1944).
31. Section 205(a) of the Act provides: "Whenever in the judgment o of the Adminis-
trator any person has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which c'nsti-
tute or vill constitute a violation of any provision of... this Act, he may make application
to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, ur f~r an order nfiurc-
ing compliance with such provision, and upon a shzing by the :ldministrator that stich
person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts. . . a pvrmanent or temporary
injunction... shall be granted without bond." 56 STAT. 33, 50 U. S C § 925a (Supp.
1942) (emphasis supplied).
32. Brief for Respondent, p. 37, Hecht Company v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944).
33. Hecht Company v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 33) (1944). The Court construed
§205 (a) of the Act as a grant of .imisdiction for the issuance of injunctions to state
and federal courts. Id. at 329.
34. "We do not mean to imply that courts should administer § 205 (a) grudgingly.
... The Administrator does not carry the sole burden of the war against inflation. The
courts also have been entrusted with a share of that responsibility. And their di-cretion
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public interest is not necessarily represented by the government agency.35 The
circumstances of the Hecht case 31 which led the District Court to the conclusion
that the issuance of the injunction prayed for by the Price Administrator would
be unjust and not "in the public interest" 37 may not have been unique. Adop-
tion of the criterion of public threat would render necessary a weighing of the
equities in the light of the concrete situation at bar. Thus the supremacy of
the public interest would still remain recognized but would not be thrown in the
balance in the government's favor as a matter of course.
Application of the two suggested criteria of bad faith and public threat to
the facts of the Montgomery Ward case would seem to sustain the Circuit
Court of Appeals' approval of the act-wide injunction. One year before the
District Court issued the decree under discussion, the defendant Montgomery
Ward & Co. was enjoined from violating the provisions of the General Maxi-
mum Price Regulation 38 issued by the Price Administrator, on the basis of
violations which, apparently, had not been inadvertent.39 The ceiling prices
of certain commodities were originally governed by the Regulation, the viola-
under § 205 (a) must be exercised in light of the large objectives of the Act. . . . That
discretion should reflect an acute awareness of the Congressional admonition that 'of all
the consequences of war, except human slaughter, inflation is the most destructive' . . .
and that delay or indifference may be fatal." Id. at 330-1, quoting from SEN. REP. No. 931,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 10.
35. In fact the courts indulge in presumptions against the government in certain circum-
stances. The most familiar example is the presumption of a defendant's innocence which
the government prosecutor must overcome beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise it seems
settled that tax statutes are to be construed against the government. "In case of doubt they
[tax statutes] are construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor of the
citizen." Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153 (1917) ; see Benziger v. United States, 192 U. S.
38, 55 (1904) ; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 474 (1891),
United States v. Isham, 17 Wall, 496, 504 (U. S. 1873).
36. The trial court had found that defendant's violatiois of the Act were inadvertent
and innocent in character, that the defendant had made "prompt and reasonable efforts" to
obey the law, and that it "consistently improved its methods . . . to . . . meet the require-
ments of the act and regulation and to combat the difficulties which arise from the elements
of human frailty." Brown v. Hecht Co., 49 F. Supp. 528, 531 (D. D. C. 1943).
37. Id. at 532. "Courts of equity are not inquisitorial but remedial. . ... it was not the
purpose of Congtess to police industry but to seek compliance for the public good and to
recognize honest and true efforts to meet the requirements of the law." Ibid. Cf. Brown
v. Sacher, 53 F. Supp. 77, 79 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). But see Bowles v. California Scrap Iron
Corp., 53 F. Supp. 40 (N. D. Cal. 1943).
38. Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F. (2d) 38, 40 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
39. See trial record in Civil Action 4809, D. C. N. D. Ill. 1942, at p. 187, quoted in
Brief for Appellee, p. 29, Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F. (2d) 38 (C, C. A.
7th, 1944) :
"TEE COURT. Of course this is the second time your client has been in here.
"MR. BALL. The circumstances of the first case was a case of inadvertence
which, I think, the court was familiar with.
"THE COURT. I am thoroughly familiar with that, ,and there was no shadow
of a defense made in the- pleadings. I am thoroughly familiar with it, and there
was not 9, shadow of a defense stated in the pleadings in the first case."
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tion of which was then enjoined. Later, however, these commodities were made
subject to a different category of ceiling prices, known as the "highest price
line." 40 The violations which formed the basis of the broad injunction in the
principal case were violations of the "highest price line" provisions, and they
were committed not only before but after the defendant had filed a protest 41
against those provisions with the Price Administrator. It is therefore not sur-
prising that the court found that the defendant "did nut comply nor make any
effort to comply" 4 with the applicable regulations. These facts would indi-
cate that the defendant failed to obey the law, not as a result of error, but btcause
it did not choose to do so. They contrast sharply with the facts in Hendcrson
v. Burd,4 3 where the defendants were acting both as selling agents for a manu-
facturer and as jobbers, but failed to grasp the nice distinction, "in good faith
under the honest belief" 44 that they were also jobbers for the manufacturer,
and as a consequence sold their goods above ceiling price. As their goud faith
justified the court in reversing a broad injunction, so the bad faith of the de-
fendants in the Mfontgomcry Ward case would tend to demand an injunction
of a scope even broader than the one denied in the Burd case.
In the midst of war deliberate violations of a statute designed to protect the
nation from inflation create a serious threat to the public welfare. The Supreme
Court has stressed that "of all the consequences of war, except human slaugh-
ter, inflation is the most destructive." '  To stem the tide of inflati m, the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 had to cover virtually all buying and
selling transactions in the United States. Enforcement of such a vast scheme
of control constitutes so tremendous a task that the very possibility i f enforce-
ment has been doubted. The success of the controls depends primarily tn a
voluntary and patriotic compliance with the law. The spectacle of a determined
offender's enrichment may be enough to withdraw that foundatii n of public
40. The regulation violated was Maximum Price Regulatiwn No,. 33 w § 13.553, 12
OPA Serv. 45:1153. A 1944 amendment of the Act prohibits the impiitin ,, highet
price line limitations on retailers. Pub. L. No. 383, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. I June &3, I441
§2(k).
41. Montgomery Ward filed its protest on April 19, 1943. In the Matter uf Mc ut-
gomery Ward and Company, 15 OPA Serv. 600:303 (Opiniun uf the Price Adminis-
trator). The Administrator's denial of the protest was later bustained by the Emer-
gency Court of Appeals in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bowles, 138 F. t2d) 6 9 (1943).
The violations at issue in the principal case occurrcd between February 24, 1943, and Sep-
tember 4, 1943. Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F. L2d) 33, 40-1 (C. C. A. 7tll,
1944).
42. Id. at 42.
43. 133 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
44. Id. at 517. In at least t-wo instances a defendant's goud faith has been deemed to
justify a denial of the granting of any injunction. Brown v. Hecht Co., 49 F. Supp. 528
(D. D. C. 1943) ; Brown v. Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky, 52 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Ala. 1943).
45. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 331 (1944) quoting from SE,.. Rn'. No. 931,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 2. The report continues: "This is true however we measure
the effect of inflation, whether on national morale, w%-ar prtduction, or dollar indebtedness."
Ibid.
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resolution without which the controls would collapse. In the face of that danger
the administrative needs of the official who carries the burden of enforcing the
Act warrant the sympathetic consideration of the courts.46 They must be mindful
that a broad injunction is the Price Administrator's only effective weapon tinder
the circumstances of the Montgomery Ward case as the use of the alternative
sanctions provided by the Act is beset with practical difficulties. License with-
drawal 47 from so important a part of the war economy as is represented by
Montgomery Ward & Company would conjure unpredictable consequences.
While criminal penalties provide for both fines and imprisonment,48 the maxi-
mum fine of five thousand dollars is not an effective deterrent to potential vio-
lators of the financial strength of Montgomery Ward, and sentences of imprison-
ment would seem a principally theoretical possibility, since subalterns are rarely
convicted by juries and evidence beyond reasonable doubt of a director's or
officer's responsibility for violations is hardly ever procurable. 4 Moreover,
both the criminal sanction and the remedy of treble damage suits 50 merely pro-
vide punishment for past violations. If future violations are committed, the
Price Administrator may be forced to institute new actions. Yet it is a physical
impossibility to bring more than two actions, each of which must be based on
an investigation, against any one defendant. By contrast, an injunction, while
leaving a defendant unmolested for his past conduct, inhibits future violations
46. Compare the language of the court in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 331
(1944) quoted in note 34 supra.
47. As provided in § 205(f) (2) of the Emergency Price Control Act. 56 STAT. 34,
50 U. S. C. § 925f (Supp. 1941-43).
48. § 205(b) of the Act. 56 STAT. 33, 50 U. S. C. § 925b (Supp. 1941-43). The inaxi-
mum term of imprisonment is two years.
49. The English Prices of Goods Act provides for somewhat stiffer penalties. On the
third and on subsequent violations of certain provisions of the Act an offender may be put
out of business altogether (the equivalent of. license withdrawal in the American act) by
order of the court, and a breach of such order is punishable by penal servitude not exceed-
ing five years. 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 118, § 7(2) ; 4 & 5 GEO. VI, c. 31, § 16(3) (1941). If a
corporation is convicted of a contravention of the Act, any directors or officers of the cor-
poration "shall be deemed guilty of that contravention, unless he proves that the contra-
vention was committed without his consent or connivance and that he exercised all such
diligence to prevent the contravention as he ought to have exercised having regard to the
nature of his functions as a director of officer of that body and to all the circumstances."
Prices of Goods Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 118, § 18. This section would seem to leave
little room for the presumption of innocence surrounding defendants in other criminal
prosecutions. The Canadian statute provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of two
years. ORDER '.iN CoUNcIL P. C. 5109 (June 16, 1942), 3 EvERG;ENCY LAWs 28-12D (1942).
The Australian statute sets no maximum limit to the term of imprisonment possible
upon a conviction on indictment for blackmarketing, nor is there any maximum limit
on the fine for corporations. Black Marketing Act, 1942, § 4(3), EzBIERaxcy LEGISLATION
HANDBOOK (2d.ed. 1943) 129.
50. § 205(e) of the Act. 56 STAT. 34, 50 U. S. C. § 925e (Supp. 1942), as amended by




by warning him that the effective sanction of a contempt proceeding -' will
follow any further breach of the law. But such a warning can be effective only
where the decree is of sufficient scope to preclude an escape from its substance
through the loopholes of its wording.
RIGHT OF A STOCKHOLDER TO FILE A PETITION FOR
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER X
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT *
THE Chandler Act 1 does not define the intracorporate authorization neces-
sary to the proper filing of a debtor's petition for a Chapter X reorganization,
but merely states that a "corporation... may, if no other petition by or against
such corporation is pending under this chapter, file a petition .... 2"- It the
absence of federal statutory criteria, bankruptcy courts have determined the
source of this authority to petition by applying the corporation laws of the
state which chartered the debtor.3 Typically thereunder, corporate managerial
51. Presumably the Price Administrator would institute civil contempt proceedings.
The right of the United States to bring civil contempt proceedings v.as recoAgnized in Mc-
Crone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61 (1939). For the distinction betwveen civil and criminal
contempt see Note (1936) 46 YArx L. J. 326.
* In re Western Tool & Mfg. Co., 142 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), cert. grancd
sub nom. Price v. Gurney, 65 Sup. Ct. 91 (U. S. 1944).
1. 52 StAT. 840 et seq. (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1940).
2. 52 STAT. 885 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 526 (1940). A "corporation" is elsewhere de-
fined as including "all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private corpora-
tions not possessed by individuals or partnerships and shall include partnership associations
organized under laws making capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts of the ,ssozia-
tion, joint-stock companies and associations, and any business conducted by a trmtee or
trustees wherein beneficial interest or ownership is evidenced by certificate or other written
instrument." 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § I(S) (1940). This definition is e.x:-
pressly made applicable to Chapter X. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 L. S. C. § 506(3) (1940).
3. In re Western Tool & Mfg. Co., 142 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), cerl. 9ranted
sub itrn. Price v. Gurney, 65 Sup. Ct. 91 (U. S. 1944) (right of stockholder to petition
under Chapter X) ; see Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S.
165, 170 (1933) (authority of directors to file voluntary petition in bankruptcy); In re
De Camp Glass Casket Co.,-272 Fed. 558 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921), cert. dcnicd, 25!.. U. S. 703
(1921) (authority of directors to file voluntary petition in bankruptcy) ; Old Fort Improve-
ment Co. v. Lea, 89 F. (2d) 286, 289 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) (right of corporation with can-
celled charter to petition under § 77B) ; cf. Mills v. Tiffany's, 193 At. 185, 189-, 123
Conn. 631, 640-1 (1938) (authorization of transfer of assets to new corporation by ban:-
rupt corporation seeking reorganization under § 77B) ; Home Powder Co. v. Geis, 2,44 Fed.
563 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913) (authority of directors to admit in writing corporate insolvency).
See 10 REmm=NG , BAI NKRUPTCY (1939) § 4434.
The Bankruptcy Act specifically leaves some questions, such as exemptions and priority
of debts, to be decided under state law. See 52 STAT. 847 (193S), 11 U. S. C. § 24 (1940);
52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 104(a) (5) (1940).
For discussion of a correlative problem, the effect of the National Bankruptcy Act
upon state insolvency statutes, see Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1690.
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capacity is vested by a general statute or charter provision in a board of direc-
tors or trustees, 4 the powers so vested being unavailable to stockholders for
direct exercise or control.5 Since, in the absence of restrictive provisions in
statute,0 charter, or by-laws, the authorization of voluntary petitions in bank-
ruptcy has long been held a function of corporate management 7 and hence
within the sole discretion of directorates,8 the same principle has naturally
been applied to voluntary corporate reorganizations. 9
Nevertheless, because influences adverse to the best interests of stockholders
may condition the determination by directors of whether reorganization peti-
4. See, e.g., CALIF. CIVIL CODE (Deering, 1941) § 305; IDAHO CoDr (1932) § 29-138;
ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 157.33; Ky. REV. STAT. (Baldwin, 1943)
§ 271.230; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1939) § 1114; MASS. L, ws ANN. (Michie, 1933) c. 156,
§ 25; MIcE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) § 21.10 (k) ; N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAWS (Bald-
win, 1938) Art. 2, §§ 26 and 27; N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie, Sublett, and Stedman, 1943)
§ 55-48; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1938) § 8623-55; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15,
§ 2852-401; TENN. CODE ANN. (Stedman and Davis, 1942) § 3742; W. VA. CODE
(Michie, Sublett, and Stedman, 1943) § 3028.
See generally 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF. CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931, supp. 1944)
§ 2097 and cases there cited.
5. "Every stockholder of a corporation holds his stock subject to the execution of all
the powers conferred by law upon the corporation, and he must abide by the decision of
the directors or stockholders, as the case may be, upon all matters which the law commits
to their determination and control." Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App, Div. 262,
271, 108 N. Y. Supp. 978, 984-5 (1st Dep't 1908). See also Fisher v. National Mortgage
Loan Co., 132 Neb. 185, 271 N. W. 433 (1937). See generally 2 FLETCHER, op. cit. upra
note 4, § 508; 5 id. § 2097.
6. See, e.g., ORE. CoMP. LAws ANN. (1940) § 77-235. This statute (then § 5070 of
the Miscellaneous Laws of Oregon) is construed in It re Quartz Gold Mining Co., 157
Fed. 243 (D. Ore. 1907), aff'd sub iton. Van Emon v. Veal, 158 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 9th,
1908). See also Petition of Evans, 52 F. (2d) 961 (D. Nev. 1931) ; Rudebeck v. Sander-
son, 227 Fed. 575 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915) ; cf. In re Bates Machine Co., 91 Fed. 625 (D. Mass.
1899) ; Inre C. Moench & Sons, 130 Fed. 685 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1904).
7. Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 165 (1933);
In re Kenwood Ice Co., 189 Fed. 525 (D. Minn. 1911), aff'd sub norn. Dodge v. Kenwood
Ice Co., 204 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913); In re Guanacevi Tunnel Co., 201 Fed. 316
(C. C. A. 2d, 1912) ; In re De Camp Glass Casket Co., 272 Fed. 558 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921),
cert. denied, 256 U. S. 703 (1921) ; In re Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 6 F (2d) 192 (C. C,
A. 2d, 1925); In re Pneumatic Tube Steam Splicer Co., 60 F. (2d) 524 (D. Md.
1932); Chicago Bank of Commerce v. Carter, 61 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
See Comments (1921) 35 HARv. L. REv. 195, (1937) 50 HARy. L. REv. 662.
8. McClung v. Hill, 96 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ; Shearin v. Cortez Oil Co.,
92 F. (2d) 855 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); In re Knox Consolidated Coal Co., 50 F. (2d) 248
(S. D. Ind. 1931) ; In re Beaver Cotton Mills, 275 Fed. 498 (N. D. Ga. 1921). See 15A
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (repl. vol. 1938) § 7629.
9. White v. Penelas Mining Co., 105 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); In re
Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 973 (S. D. W. Va. 1941), reld on other grounds sub
twin. Sims v. Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 129 F. (2d) 442 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942), af'd, 318
U. S. 608 (1943). See 10 REmINGTON, loc. cit. supra note 3.
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tions are to be filed,' 0 this independence of judgment, if rigidly preserved, may
allow dissipation of corporate assets by an inequitable or improper filing or
failure to file."' Chapter X, in partial recognition of this possibility, expressly
allows any stockholder of a solvent debtor to intervene and defend in any
voluntary or involuntary reorganization proceeding.12  Explicit provision is
lacking, however, to cover instances where directors through willful inaction
or other disqualification 13 fail to petition although such a course is obviously
necessary to preserve the equities of stockholders. The problem arises, there-
fore, of ascertaining under what conditions, if any, the bankruptcy courts as
courts of equity 14 will act to prevent any possible intracorporate abuse by
permitting a stockholder to institute a Chapter X proceeding in the name of his
debtor corporation.
Illustration is afforded by a recent case.Yi An Ohio corporation defaulted in
1923 in the payment of interest due on $90,000 worth of bonds secured by a
first mortgage. A bondholders' committee was formed, and to it was trans-
ferred a majority of the outstanding stock in accordance with a voting trust
agreement; the committee thereafter controlled corporate policies by electing
the board of directors. After the corporation had partially defaulted on the
bonds for twenty years, the committee instituted a mortgage fore-
closure proceeding,' and the directors filed an answer consenting to the
relief demanded. The equitable owners of the stock deposited under the vot-
ing trust agreement then petitioned on behalf of the corporation for a re-
organization under Chapter X,' 7 alleging that the corporation was insolvent
10. In JHERI G, DER ZwEcr m REcHrT (1877) it is stated that the position of admin-
istrator of group property is the most potentially dangerous to society of any lmown to the
law. Id. at 226-7, Husik's trans. (1913) at 167-8.
11. See general discussion of the possibilities of intracorporate defection in Horn-
stein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derrative Suits (1939) 39 C~o. L. Rn-. 784;
Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind UP a Corporation
at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 220.
12. 52 STAT. 887 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §537 (1940).
13. In re Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 973, 933 (S. D. W. Va. 1941), cited
supra note 9 (quorum of directors unavailable for authorization of corporate action); In re
Mississippi Valley Utilities Corp., 2 F. Supp. 995 (D. Del. 1933) (directors elected at
stockholders' meeting without notice to all stockholders as required in by-laws) ; Michel-
sen v. Penney, 41 F. Supp. 603 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) (director not owner of corporate
stock as required by statute) ; In the 'Matter of the Election of Directors of the Broa!yn
Baseball Club, 75 N. J. L. 64, 66 Att. 1051 (1907) (directors did not file report of their
election with secretary of state as required by statute).
14. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. C., R. I. & P. R. R., 294
U. S. 648, 675 (1935) ; SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434,
457 (1940) ; In re E. C. Denton Stores, 5 F. Supp. 307, 310 (S. D. Ohio 1933).
15. In re Western Tool & Mfg. Co., 142 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), cert. granted
sub norn. Price v. Gurney, 65 Sup. Ct. 91 (U. S. 1944).
16. Price v. Western Tool & Mfg. Co., Docket No. 36,421 (filed July 9, 1942), Ct. C. P.,
Clark County, Ohio.
17. In re Western Tool & Mfg. Co., Docket No. 9061 (filed Jan. 11, 1943), D. C. S. D.
Ohio.
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merely in the equity sense of being unable to meet maturing debts and that the
stockholders' equities would be lost by the foreclosure; that the directors'
conflict of interests had been resolved wholly in favor of the creditors; and
that a demand made on the directors to petition for reorganization had been
refused.
A motion to dismiss by the committee and by the corporation through its
president and secretary in effect attacked the stockholders' standing to peti-
tion on two jurisdictional grounds: (1) that such facts of mismanagement
had not been shown as would. give the stockholders authority in law to main-
tain a derivative action,18 and (2) that under Chapter X a corporation may
18. In Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1881), the leading American case on
stockholders' derivative suits, Mr. Justice Miller stated that in order for a stockholder
to sue on behalf of his corporation there must be:
"Some action or threatened action of the managing board of directors, or
trustees of the corporation which is beyond the authority conferred on them by
their charter or other source of organization;
"Or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by the acting man-
agers, in connection with some other party, or among themselves, or with other
shareholders as will result in serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests
of the other shareholders;
"Or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their
own interest, in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of
the other shareholders;
"Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally
pursuing a course in the name of the corporation which is in violation of the rights
of the other shareholders and which can only be restrained by the aid of a court
of equity.
"... It is equally important that.., the shareholder. ., show to the satisfaction
of the court that he has exhausted all the means . . . to obtain, within the cor-
poration itself, the redress of hiis grievances, or action in conformity to his
wishes. He must make an earnest, not a simulated effort .... If time permits,
or has permitted, he must show if he fails with the directors, that he has made
an honest effort to obtain action by the stockholders ai a body. ... " Id. at 460-1.
The United States Supreme Court embodied the holding of the Hawes case in Equity
Rule 94, 104 U. S. ix (1882). To forestall stockholder claim-mongering and to prevent
corporations from using the stockholder's suit to confer diversity jurisdiction on federal
courts, the rule contained the additional requirements that the plaintiff be a shareholder
at the time of the complained-of transaction and that he make a specific assertion under
oath of the non-collusive character of the suit. With slight verbal modifications the rule
was readopted as Equity Rule 27, 226 U. S. 656 (1912). Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, adopted in 1938, it is Rule 23(b). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PaACrIcE (1938, supp.
1943) § 23.05.
In some states, derivative suits are regulated by express statute. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. (Park, Skillman, and Strozier, 1936) §22-711. This statute (then §2224 of the
Georgia Civil Code) is construed in Bush v. Bonner, 156 Ga. 143, 118 S. E. 658 (1923);
Macon Gas Co. v. Richter, 143 Ga. 397,85 S. E. 112 (1915). See note 68 infra.
For treatment of the general nature of derivative suits, see Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1936), reh. denied, 297 U. S. 728 (1936); 13 FL Ercua,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (repl. vol. 1943) §§ 5939-6045; Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit
-Corporate and Individual Grievances (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 580; McLaughlin, Capacity of
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file a petition only through its elected directors. Without making f£ndings of
fact or drawing conclusions of law, the trial court dismissed the proceeding
as not within the stockholders' derivative suit rule of Hawes v. City of Oak-
land.19 The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, without clearly differentiating
between the points of jurisdiction mentioned above, held that by Ohio law
"under the facts [alleged] the equitable owners of stock of the debtor were
authorized to institute these proceedings" !I and remanded the case for dis-
position upon ultimate findings of fact.
In so holding, the court disregarded the traditional judicial reluctance to
interfere in internal corporate affairs requiring an exercise of busi-
ness judgment 21 and viewed the situation presented as following the basic
pattern of recognized derivative actions.2 2  Whenever directors, as qutasi-
trustees to their corporation and its stockholders,2 3 have held their office
subject to conflicting interests, equity has been prone to scrutinize any cor-
porate action complained of by the stockholders 2 4 and to demand a showing
by the directors of the utmost good faith and loyalty.2 3 Directors free to exer-
Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stoclzholders Suit (1937) 46 YALt L J. 421; Note
(1931) 15 AMxx. L. REv. 453.
19. 104 U. S. 450 (1881). See note 18 supra.
20. In rc Western Tool & Mfg. Co., 142 F. (2d) 404, 411 (1944), cited supra note 3.
21. Korn and Visemiller v. Ifutual Assurance Soc. Against Fire on Buildings of the
State of Virginia, 6 Cranch 192 (U. S. 1810) ; Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311
U. S. 531 (1941); Bill v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 16 Fed. 14 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1883) ; Altoona Warehouse Co. v. Bynum, 242 Ala. 540, 7 So. (2d) 497 (1942) ; Briggs v.
Scripps, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 43, 56 P. (2d) 277 (1936); Mountain States Packing Co. v.
Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 Pac. 737 (1929); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. He,'witt
Realty Co., 257 N. Y. 62, 177 N. E. 309 (1931). See 13 FLETrcM.a, op. Cit. supra note 18,
§ 5821 and cases there cited.
22. See note 18 supra.
23. The courts have ordinarily spoken of the relationship of directors to stockholders
and corporations in terms analogous to those used in describing trusts. See, e.g., Southern
Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483 (1919); Bosworth v. AUen, 16S N. Y. 157, 61 N. E.
163 (1901); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App. Div. 97,
31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1st Dep't 1941) ; Note (1942) 51 Ym.E L. J. 1034. Since directors are
not, however, true trustees, Pomeroy prefers the term "quasi-trustee." 4 Po'rmoy, E2murn
JuasPuDENcE (5th ed. 1941) §§ 1088-90.
24. Boldenweck v. Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 Pac. 634 (1907) ; Smith v. Stone, 21 W¥yo.
62, 128 Pac. 612 (1912) ; Bergman Clay Mfg. Co. v. Bergman, 73 Wash. 144, 131 Pac. 485
(1913) ; Gordon v. Santa Cruz Portland Cement Co., 130 P. (2d) 232 (Cal. D. C. App.
1943) ; Everett v. Phillips, 288 N. Y. 227, 236, 43 N. E. (2d) 18, 21 (1942).
25. "That a director of a joint-stock corporation occupies one of those fiduciary rela-
tions where his dealings with the subject-matter of his trust or agency, and with the benefi-
ciary or party whose interest is confided to his care, is viewed with jealousy by the courts,
and may be set aside on slight grounds, is a doctrine founded on the soundest morality, and
which has received the dearest recognition in this court and others." Twin-Lick Oil Co. v.
Marbury, 91 U. S. 587, 588 (1875). The cases uniformly take this view. See, e.g., Scott
v. Norton Hardware Co., 54 F. (2d) 1047 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Long, 139 Kan. 632, 32 P. (2d) 464 (1954). See 3 FLrrcHER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 918
and cases there cited.
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cise an unprejudiced discretion would ordinarily defend in a mortgage fore-
closure suit or, in the absence of a valid defense, would seek to protect their
insolvent corporate cestui que trust through reorganization. Neglect so to do
would appear either actually or constructively to fall within that part of the
rule of Hawes v. City of Oakland 26 allowing a stockholder to act on behalf
of a corporation "where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are
acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the corporation
itself, or the rights of the other shareholders." 27
The uniqueness of the principal case lies in the remedy sought. In the past
the rule has been that when a court assumed jurisdiction of a stockholder's
suit, it would grant any relief which the corporation could have obtained had
it sued for itself.2 8 The diversity of remedies has been wide: temporary 20 or
pendente lite"0 receivership; specific performance; 8 money decrees; 82 re-
moval of corporate officers a3 or directors; 34 accounting; 85 dissolution, 6 wind-
26. 104 U. S. 450 (1881). See note 18 supra.
27. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 460 (1881).
28. Collins v. Penn-Wyoming Copper Co., 203 Fed. 726 (D. Wyo. 1912); Reid v.
Robinson, 64 Cal. App. 46, 220 Pac. 676 (1923) ; Morris v. Elyton Land Co., 125 Ala. 263,
28 So. 513 (1900) ; Viley v. Wall, 159 La. 627, 105 So. 794 (1925) , Briggs v. Kennedy
Mayonnaise Products, Inc., 209 Minn. 312, 297 N. W. 342 (1941).
29. Burnrite Coal Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208 (1927) ; Scholl v. Allen, 237 Ky. 716,
36 S. W. (2d) 353 (1931) ; Cantwell v. Columbia Lead Co., 199 Mo. 1, 97 S. W. 167 (1906).
The authority of a stockholder to seek appointment of a receiver is sometimes granted
by a general statute. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1938) § 2293; Fidelity Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Cain, 28 S. W. (2d) 833 (Tex. Civ. App., 1930).
Ordinarily the receivership must be ancillary to other equitable relief. Hoiles v.
Watkins, 117 Ohio St. 165, 157 N. E. 557 (1927) ; Laumeier v. Sun-Ray Products Co,,
330 Mo. 542, 50 S. W. (2d) 640 (1932). Some courts, however, admit exceptions to this
requirement. Scholl v. Allen, supra; Specialty Furniture Co. v. Rusche, 212 Ind. 184,
6 N. E. (2d) 959 (1937).
30. Clark v. National Linseed Oil Co., 105 Fed. 787 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901) ; Mulvirhill v,
Vicksburg R. R., Power & Mfg. Co., 88 Miss. 689, 40 So. 647 (1907) ; Reusens v. Mfg, &
Selling Co. of America, 99 App. Div. 214, 90 N. Y. Supp. 1010 (1st Dep't 1904).
31. J'residio Mining Co. v. Overton, 270 Fed. 388 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921), cert. denied,
256 U. S. 694 (1921); Barr v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R., 96 N. Y. 444 (1884).
32. Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, 29 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928);
Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 283 Mo. 237,223 S. W. 423 (1920).
33. Nathan v. Tompkins, 82 Ala. 437 (1886).
34. Andrews v. Drake, 83 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) ; Saltz v. Saltz Bros., Inc.,
89 F. (2d) 860 (App. D. C. 1937).
35. Bell v. Frank Gilbert Paper Co., 117 Misc. 610, 193 N. Y. Supp. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1922),
aff'd, 201 App. Div. 867, 193 N. Y. Supp. 925 (3rd Dep't 1922) ; cf. Fredendall v. Shrader,
45 Cal. App. 719, 188 Pac. 580 (1920).
36. The general rule is that equity has no jurisdiction to dissolve a corporation inde-
pendently of statute. Pearce v. Sutherland, 164 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908) ; Taylor v.
Decatur Mineral & Land Co., 112 Fed. 449 (D. Ala. 1901). In exceptional circumstances,
however, even in the absence of statute, the remedy has been granted. Edison v. Flecken-
stein Pump Co., 249 Mich. 234, 228 N. W. 705 (1930) (impossible to attain corporate
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ing up,37 or reinstatement of corporation; "' rescission or cancellation of con-
tract 39 or other written instrument; -0 mandamus; 4 declaration of trust in
corporate assets wrongfully diverted to third parties with notice.2 Since re-
organization is a form of relief equally available to a corporation, it would
seem to follow that a stockholder's right to petition is thereby established
unless Chapter X by mandatory terms prohibits its assertion.
While it is true that Chapter X nowhere specifies the power of a stockholder
to petition for his corporation, neither does it negative the possibility. In
granting to "corporations" the authority tri take advantage of the chapter's
provisions, 43 Congress apparently anticipated that they would file ptitlons
only according to normal usage through their duly elected dircctors.'" Never-
theless, the statement of the Supreme Court that "an enactment of Congress
dealing with bankruptcy should be read in harmony with the existing system
of equity jurisprudence of which it is a part" - gives basis for argument.
Since "corporations" in numerous instances have been forced to act through
their stockholders in matters usually within the scope of managerial authority,
it seems reasonable to assert that this means of self-protection is not precluded
under Chapter X without express provision. TMoreover, an assumption that the
meaning of "corporation" in Chapter X 46 restricts "corporate action" to that
purposes); Abbott v. Loring, 303 111. 154, 135 N. E. 442 (1922) (fraud or breach of
trust in incorporation and organization) ; Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 153 Arl. 329, 241
S. VW. 21 (1922) (fraud or breach of trust in management of corporation).
37. In some jurisdictions, the courts draw a distinctin between the di~solution and
winding up of a corporation, decreeing the latter %ithut statute, but not the former.
Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. of W. Va. v. Piedmont Coal Co., L4 F. (2d) 817, S29
(C. C. A. 4th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 675 (1933 ); Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour
Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 217 Pac. 301 (1923); Benedict v. Columbus Constr. Co.,
49 N. J. Eq. 23, 23 Ad. 485 (Ch. 1892); Nashville Packet Co. v. Neville, 144 Tenn. 693,
235 S. W. 64 (1921). See Hornstein, .1 Rcmed for Corporate Abrsc-Jvdkial Powcr to
lWind Up a Corporation at the Sit of a Minority Stochholder (1940) 40 CoL. L R E' 220,
221-5.
38. Southern Land Co. v. McKenna, 1U Cal. App. 152, 220 Pac. 144 (1929). See
Comment (1939) 48 Y.ALE L. J. 650, 60,3.
39. Morris v. Elyton Land Co., 125 Ala. 20,3, 2S So. 513 (1900) ; Kidd v. New Hamp-
shire Traction Co., 72 N. H. 273, 56 At. 465 (1903).
40. Howard v. National Telephone Co., 182 Fed. 215 (C. C. N. D. W. Va. 1910);
Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 99 N. E. 13 (1912).
41. Walsh v. State, 199 Ala. 123, 74 So. 45 k1917); People v. Cumning:, 72 1. Y.
433 (1878).
42. Meagher v. Harrington, 78 Mont. 457,254 Pac. 432 (1927); Druchlieb v. Harris, 84
Misc. 291, 147 N. Y. Supp. 298 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
43. 52 STAT. 885 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 526 (1940). See supra p. 151.
44. See H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sesq. (1937) 3941; Hcarings Before
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Represe ntathes on H. R. COI6, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 293, 335-47; Hearings Before a Sdl,com nitice of the Courn,,11tce
on the Jvdiciary of the Uvitcd States Senate on H. R. OJO, 75th Cong., 2nd Sers. (1933)
48, 91.
45. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 457 (1940).
46. 52 STAT. 885 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 526 (1940).
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authorized by directors creates the anomaly that stockholders may intervene
to prevent managerial fraud in filing,4 7 but may not themselves petition to
prevent managerial fraud in not filing. In viev of the basic purpose of Chap-
ter X to afford adequate relief to distressed corporations,48 it appears likely
that the courts will not support such a construction, but will follow the principal
case, defining with particularity, as the need arises, the conditions of their
sanction of a stockholder's petition.
These conditions seemingly must include the traditional derivative suit re-
quirements 49 modified to the field of reorganization. In addition to alleging
and proving actual or virtual directorial fraud and refusal of redress, it would
appear a sine qua non that the corporation be insolvent in the equity sense
alone, for if bankrutpcy insolvency exists, under the Boyd case doctrine 60 the
stockholder would have no pecuniary interest in the reorganization, the maxim
then applying that equity will not aid a volunteer. Like all petitioners, he
must show that the petition was filed in good faith as defined by Chapter X.51
47. "Prior to the first date set for the hearing provided in section 161 of this Act, al
answer controverting the allegations of a petition by or against a debtor may be filed.. ,,
if the debtor is not insolvent, by any stockholder of the debtor." 52 STAT. 887 (1938),
11 U. S. C. § 537 (1940).
48. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947, 950 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (con-
struing former § 77B).
49. See note 18 supra.
50. Northern Pac- Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913), reiterated in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 308 U. S. 106 (1939). The doctrine of the Boyd
case, while interpreted variously, is usually stated as preventing junior economic interests
from participating, under ordinary circumstances, in a reorganization unless senior claims
are fully satisfied.
Tile law reviews have feasted well and often on the Boyd and Los Angeles Company
case. See Dean, Corporate Reorganization (1941) 26 CORN. L. Q. 537; Dodd, The Los
Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications (1943) 53 MARV. L. REv.
713; Fennell, Some Reflections on the Los Angeles Lumber Company Case (1940) 29
GEo. L. J. 36; Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44 YALn. L. J. 923;
Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganiation (1933)
19 VA. L. REv. 541 ; Gerdes, A Fair and Equitable Plan of Corporate Reorganiration Under
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 1; Graham, Fair Re-
organization Plans Under Chapter X of the Chandler Act (1938) 8 BROOKLYN L. REv.
137; Rosenberg, Reorganization--The Next Step (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 14; Spaeth and
Winks, The Boyd Case and Section 77 (1938) 32 ILL. L. Rzv. 769; Swaine, Reorganiza-
tion-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. Janes N. Rosenberg (1922) 22 COL. L. Rav. 121;
Comments (1940) 25 IowA L. Rav. 793, (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 841; Notes (1940) 49 YArn
L. 3. 1099, (1940) 49 YaE L. J. 1297. See also SEC REPoRT ON THE STUDY AND INVEsTI-
-ATION OF THE WoRic, AcrvITIEs, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND RE-
ORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, pt. VIII (1940) 142-61.
51. If the judge is not satisfied the petition has been filed in good faith, he is to dismiss
it. 52 STAT. 887 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §541 (1940). Good faith is not present if (1) the
petitioning creditors have acquired their claims for the purpose of filing the petition; or
(2) adequate relief may be obtained by the debtor under Chapter XI; or (3) it is unrea-
sonable to expect that a plan of reorganization may be effected; or (4) a prior proceed-
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Judicial policy against daim-mongering would require that the petitioner not
have purchased his stock for the purposes of instituting the reorganization c.2
The smallness of his holdings r3 or the fact that he is not an owner of rccord, s
however, should not interfere.
It has been argued that a judicial determination of whether a board of direc-
tors has in fact breached its fiduciary relationship involves disputes -9o far
afield from reorganization that bankruptcy courts are without jurisdiction to
entertain petitions until such matters have been litigated in a plenary equity
proceeding. 55 This objection, however, seems specious. for courti alway_;
ing pending in any court would better subserve the interc ts 4,f crelittirs and Ct, 7hldr.
52 STAT. 887 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 546 (194(s). See Marine Harblr Prvpl.jrtic-k 1..Ilt*u-
facturers Trust Co., 317 U. S. 78 (1942).
It is probable that petitioning stochdolders would have the mL,,t difficulty Vxitll t. _&-
lishing under (3) above that a plan of reorganization may reasonably U e:.lctJ to
succeed, for it is necessary that two-thirds of each class of creditors conscnt tu a I,rop,.il
plan. 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §2579 (1940); 52 Stat. "115 11933), 11 U..% S.,
§ 616(7) (1940). And it may appear that well over one-third of the creditors irolicate in
advance that they will not consent to any conceivable plan. See Brief f.,r ,\.p llc, -,
pp. 28-9, In re Vestern Tool & Mfg. Co., 142 F. (2d) 404 (1944). cited sutra v te 3.
It was pointed out, however, in In re Castle Beach Apartments, Inc., 113 F. (241 71:2 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1940), that without the consent of the court any indiLation of crditt, appru%al
or disapproval is nugatory under the Bankruptcy Act, 52 ST%'T. S91 (1933), 11 U. S. C.
§ 576 (1940), and should be judicially ignored for the purposes ,f entertaining er di,-
missing the petition. In re Castle Beach Apartments, Inc., supra at 764. So' aL, In Ye
Blinrig Realty Corp., 114 F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). It is interesting to ntct that
despite an initial indication of unwillingness to consent by 751" - of the crcditorz in the
Castle Beach reorganization, a plan was eventually accepted by the rcquiite tmu-t"Aid, 04
each class and consummated. In rc Castle Beach Apartments Co., Dcchet I 11o. 5, Pt, ),
D. C. S.D. N.Y.
52. This would be analogous to the requirement in Federal Rule 23(b) th-it the
plaintiff be a stockholder at the time of the complained-of trauwacti'n, Frn. Rt-r ; Cy.
Po. 23(b), and to the good-faith requirement that petitioning crcditvrs sliall n' have
acquired their claims for the purpose of filing the petition. 52 STAT. *,37 (1933), 11 U. S. C.
§546 (1940).
53. This is an established stockholder's suit principle and may prLp2erly be rtap,],
since the petitioning stockholders' interest in the reorganization is real, and the bmLcfits
accrue to all stockholders. See Ashv-ander v. Tennessee Valley Authrity, 297 U. . i,
318 (1936), reh. denicd, 297 U. S. 728 (193t ; General Inv. Cv. v. Lake Shore & MA. b.
Ry., 250 Fed. 160, 173 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918). But cf. Mdrich v. Union Bag & Paper C9,, z1
N. J. Eq. 244, 87 Atl. 65 (1913).
54. Since reorganization proceedings are in equity, equitable rights hvuld Uzz pro-
tected as well as legal. Hall v. M. B. O'Reilly Realty & Inwstmuit Co., 30 : ,.lv 2,
267 S. W. 407 (1924) ; Fisher v. Patton, 134 Mo. 32, 33 S. W. 451 (M95); Litvip. %.
Allen, 168 Misc. 205, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 55 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; GrLat Western Ry. v. Ru iiout,
5 De G. & S. 290 (1852). See note 14 sutra.
55. See Judge Hicks, dissenting in In re Vestern To.l & Mfg. C', 142 Y. 24,' 41f'-t.
cited supra note 3, at 411.
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have power to pass upon inatters germane to their jurisdiction,"° including in a
stockholder's suit whatever relates to the alleged dii'ectorial defections. Directly
analogous are reorganization proceedings instituted on creditors' petitions,67
in which extrinsic questions pertaining to the jurisdictional allegations 68 are
constantly raised by litigants and passed upon by the bankruptcy courts. 0
In granting to the complaining stockholders a standing as petitioners for
corporate reorganization, the Sixth Circuit has set a seemingly valuable prece-
dent, for extension of the stockholders' suit principle to the field of reorganiza-
tion augments present judicial safeguards against intracorporate misconduct.
While it is possible that instances of nuisance and "strike" suits or specu-
lative lawyer's fee litigation may appear, the low fees generally allowed
lawyers for petitioners C0 and the speedy hearings usually held on petitions,0 '
56. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938) ; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940).
57. 52 STAT. 885 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 526 (1940). Three or more creditors having
liquidated claims amounting in the aggregate to $5,000 or over against the corporation or its
property may file. Ibid.
Stockholders as such may not petition on the theory that their holdings of stock con-
stitute them corporate creditors. Bryan v. Welch, 74 F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935),
cert. denied, 295 U. S. 748 (1935); In re Picadilly Realty Co., 78 F. (2d) 257 (C. C, A.
7th, 1935); In re Pittsburgh Terminal Corp., 30 F. Supp. 106 (W. D. Pa. 1939), aff'd
on opinion of lower court, 109 F. (2d) 1020 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940).
58. All petitions must contain certain allegations. 52 STAT. 886 (1938), 11 U. S, C.
§ 530 (1940). Creditors' and indenture trustees' petitions must contain others in addition.
52 STAT. 886 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 531 (1940).
59. In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 19 F. Supp. 204 (N. D. 111. 1937) (construing
former. § 77B) ; I; re West Virginia Printing Co., 11 F. Supp. 211 (D. W. Va. 1935)
(construing former § 77B); cf. In rc Cheney Bros., 12 F. Supp. 609 (D. Conn. 1935)
(construing former §77B).
60. The judge is given discretion to allow reasonable compensation for services. 52
STAT. 900 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 641-2 (1940).
"A very broad discretion is lodged in the chancellor in the allowance and fixing of
fees and he must ever be alert lest a reorganization inure to the benefit, not of the dis-
tressed debtor and its creditors, but only to those engaged in saving it .... The statute
defines the groups that nzay be compensated, but this is in no sense to be construed as
meaning shall be compensated." Pennish v. Herz Inc., 81 F. (2d) 511, 512, 513 (C. C. A. 7th,
1936) (construing former § 77B) ; Teasdale v. Sefton Nat. Fibre Can Co., 85 F. (2d) 379
(C. C. A. 8th, 1936) (construing former § 77B) ; In re Paramount Publix Corp.; 85 F.
(2d) 588 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (construing former § 77B). See generally 3 GERDEs, Con-
'ORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) § 1170; 10 RE-INGTON, BAXnKRUrcy (1939) § 4645.
61. Through summary proceedings the bankruptcy courts generally dispose of matters
before them more quickly than do other courts in plenary suits. In addition, unlike the
majority of derivative suits, hearings on petitions do not necessitate the submission of
evidence on damages, thereby reducing the time needed to prepare for trial. See Central
Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F. (2d) 721, 731 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Bien
v. Robinson, 208 U. S. 423 (1908). See generally FINLETTER, BANKRUPrTcv REORGANIZA-
TiON (1939) 156-67; 2 GERDES, op. cit. supra note 60, §§ 848-9, 851.
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in contradistinction to the practice in other forms of derivative actions,r -2 should
discourage such abuse. The danger is further minimized by the provisions of
Chapter X, which permit the bankruptcy courts to dismiss petitions only after
a hearing with notice to creditors and stockholders 03 and which subject all
allowances upon dismissal 4 to a hearing with notice to the same parties. ' 5
If experience proves otherwise, appropriate cuntrols may be found in strict
requirements for specification of facts in petitions; Go in extensive use of the
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and motion to dismiss; " or, if
necessary, in requiring security for costs, perhaps including the counsel fees of
defense.0 s
62. "It has become the common practice on a recovery or court-approved ECttlement
of a stockholder's action, to allow plaintiff's counsel fees out of the recovery in amounts
ranging from twenty to forty percent of the total, with apparent distinction between trials
and settlements and little regard to the usual principle of scaling percentages dow:n as the
amounts increase." WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REG.nDG STocrnoLrEFA.s' DuavAmT
SUITS (Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, 1944) 11. In tw:elve rerent
derivative actions, counsel fees allowed for the stockholders' attorneys ranged from
$40,080 to $135,000. Id. at S. A number of the suits in New York courts have taken more
than a month to try, and "in two instances they occupied the time of one part of the
Supreme Court for more than a year (Doamvaa tv. Alas Corp.. N. Y. Co. 34D32-1934;
Wciss z. General Investment Corp., N. Y. Co. 31607-1937)." Ibmid.
Calendar congestion of civil suits in the federal courts has been commented upon:
"The median time for each circuit and for the District of Columbia was as follows: First
Circuit, 15.8 months; Second Circuit, 18 months; Third Circuit, 138 months; Fourth
Circuit, 5.6 months; Fifth Circuit, 6.3 months; Sixth Circuit, 13.7 months; Seventh
Circuit, 11 months; Eighth Circuit, 8.1 months; Ninth Circuit, 11.5 months; Tenth Cir-
cuit, 8.3 months; District of Columbia, 12.2 months." Sco:.D Am: .. Rgrar oF Tar
DmccToR OF THE ADmINISRATIVE OFFICE OF TIE UNITeS) STATES CounTs (1941) 26.
See Moore, The Snpreme Court: 1940, 1943 Terms-The Supreme Court a:d .vdicial
Administration (1942) 28 VA. L. REv. 261, 8S6-7.
63. 52 STAT. 899 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §636(2) (1940).
64. 52 STAT. 901 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §646 (1940).
65. 52 STAT. 901 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §647 (1940).
66. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 281 N. Y. 180 (1939).
67. General Order in Bankruptcy 37 renders the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
applicable to the Bankruptcy Act. General Order 37, 305 U. S. 693 (1939), following 30
STAkT. 554 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §53 (1940).
68. See WOOD, op. cit. supra note 62, at 21 ct seq. Section 61 of the New York Gen-
eral Corporation Law was recently amended, N. Y. Laws 1944, c. 03o, empowering
corporations in whose right derivative actions are brought to require plaintiff-sharcholders
with less than 5% of the outstanding shares (unless the shares have a market value in
excess of $50,000) to give "security for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees:'
Ibid. For discussion and criticism, see Carson, Further Phases of Deri at ve Actions Against
Directors (1944) 29 CORx. L. Q. 431, 452-60; Hornstein, The Dcath Knell of Stockholders'
Derivative Suits in N"cz' York (1944) 32 CAIF,. L. REV. 123.
